basic encryption key material handling
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c41b00ccfa
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15bd8578df
3 changed files with 183 additions and 10 deletions
147
srt/crypt.go
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147
srt/crypt.go
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package srt
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import (
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"hash"
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"math"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"crypto/cipher"
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)
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type CryptHandler struct {
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salt [16]byte
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key_len uint8
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odd_sek cipher.Block
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even_sek cipher.Block
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}
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// init will apply to KM message immediately
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func NewCryptHandler(passphrase string, km_msg *KMMSG) (*CryptHandler) {
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crypt := new(CryptHandler)
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crypt.key_len = km_msg.key_len
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crypt.salt = km_msg.salt
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ok := crypt.Unwrap(km_msg.wrapped_key, passphrase, km_msg.key_type)
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if !ok {
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return nil
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}
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return crypt
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}
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// PRF as defined in RFC 8018
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func PRF(h hash.Hash, input []byte) ([]byte) {
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h.Reset()
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h.Write(input)
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return h.Sum(nil)
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}
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// gets KEK from passphrase and salt according to fixed SRT iterations and algo from RFC doc
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// see RFC 8018 for implementation details
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func SRT_PBKDF2(passphrase string, salt []byte, dklen uint8) ([]byte) {
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prf := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(passphrase))
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hlen := prf.Size()
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l := int(math.Ceil(float64(dklen) / float64(hlen)))
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r := int(dklen) - (l - 1) * hlen
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key := make([]byte, 0)
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for block := 1; block <= l; block++ {
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U := make([]byte, hlen)
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T := make([]byte, hlen)
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block_i := make([]byte, 4)
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(block_i, uint32(block))
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U = PRF(prf, append(salt, block_i...))
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copy(T, U)
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// skip one iter since done above
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for n := 1; n < 2048; n++ {
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U = PRF(prf, U)
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for x := range T {
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T[x] ^= U[x]
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}
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}
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// final block may not use entire SHA output, still need full during computation
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if block == l {
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T = T[:r]
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}
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// final key is appended sequence of all blocks computed independently
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key = append(key, T...)
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}
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return key
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}
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// See RFC 3394, inplace implementation
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func AES_UNWRAP(key []byte, wrapped []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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seks := make([]byte, 0) // bytes past IV
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cipher, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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return seks, err
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}
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A := wrapped[:8] // IV bytes
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n := len(wrapped) / 8 - 1
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R := make([][]byte, n) // actual message (SEKs)
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for i := range R {
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R[i] = wrapped[(i + 1) * 8: (i + 2) * 8]
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}
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for j := 5; j >= 0; j-- {
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for i := n; i > 0; i-- {
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t := make([]byte, 8)
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(t, uint64(n * j + i))
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for k := range t {
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t[k] ^= A[k]
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}
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B := make([]byte, 16)
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cipher.Decrypt(B, append(t, R[i - 1]...))
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copy(A, B[:8])
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copy(R[i - 1], B[8:])
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}
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}
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// SRT uses default IV, 8 repeating bytes of 0xa6 prepended in wrap, check if
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// preserved in unwrap
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for i := range A {
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if A[i] != 0xa6 {
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return seks, errors.New("IV not default")
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}
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}
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// R is 8 byte blocks, keys can be 16-32 bytes, prepend all together and
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// let wrappers figure it out
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for _, v := range R {
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seks = append(seks, v...)
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}
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return seks, nil
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}
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// unwrap and store SEK ciphers, key_type defined as KK 2-bit value in Key Material from SRT docs
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func (crypt *CryptHandler) Unwrap(wrapped_key []byte, passphrase string, key_type uint8) (bool) {
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kek := SRT_PBKDF2(passphrase, crypt.salt[8:], crypt.key_len)
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// need a copy since original will be sent back
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wrapped_copy := make([]byte, len(wrapped_key))
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copy(wrapped_copy, wrapped_key)
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seks, err := AES_UNWRAP(kek, wrapped_copy)
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// either unwrap fails or key len does not match expected (1 or 2 SEKs len identical)
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if err != nil || len(seks) % int(crypt.key_len) != 0 {
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return false
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}
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// always have one SEK, if more bytes (second key) and peer did not send 2 keys
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// something is wrong
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sek_1 := seks[:crypt.key_len]
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if len(seks) > int(crypt.key_len) && key_type != 3 {
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return false
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}
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switch key_type {
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case 1:
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crypt.even_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_1)
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case 2:
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crypt.odd_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_1)
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case 3:
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sek_2 := seks[crypt.key_len:]
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crypt.even_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_1)
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crypt.odd_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_2)
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default:
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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@ -210,14 +210,18 @@ func marshall_hs_cif(data *HandshakeCIF) ([]byte) {
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ext_buff[12:14], contents.recv_delay)
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ext_buff[14:16], contents.send_delay)
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case 4:
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contents := extension.ext_contents.(*KMMSG)
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[4:8], uint32(0x12202900) | uint32(contents.key_type))
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[12:16], uint32(0x02000200))
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[16:20], uint32(0x0400) | uint32(contents.key_len / 4))
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for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
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ext_buff[20 + i] = contents.salt[i]
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contents, ok := extension.ext_contents.(*KMMSG)
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if !ok { // handle km_state error
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copy(ext_buff[4:8], extension.ext_contents.([]byte))
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} else {
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[4:8], uint32(0x12202900) | uint32(contents.key_type))
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[12:16], uint32(0x02000200))
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[16:20], uint32(0x0400) | uint32(contents.key_len / 4))
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for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
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ext_buff[20 + i] = contents.salt[i]
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}
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copy(ext_buff[36:], contents.wrapped_key)
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}
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copy(ext_buff[36:], contents.wrapped_key)
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default:
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copy(ext_buff[4:], extension.ext_contents.([]byte))
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}
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@ -317,12 +321,13 @@ func parse_hs_cif(cif *HandshakeCIF, buffer []byte) (error) {
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content := new(KMMSG)
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content.key_type = extensions[7] & 0x3
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content.key_len = extensions[19] * 4
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for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
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for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
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content.salt[i] = extensions[20 + i]
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}
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wrap_key_len := 4 + ext.ext_len - 24
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// -36 from actual content len, extensions includes headers as well
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wrap_key_len := 4 + ext.ext_len - 36
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content.wrapped_key = make([]byte, wrap_key_len)
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copy(content.wrapped_key, extensions[24:24 + wrap_key_len])
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copy(content.wrapped_key, extensions[36:36 + wrap_key_len])
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ext.ext_contents = content
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default:
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content := make([]byte, ext.ext_len)
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@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ const (
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)
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type SRTManager struct {
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crypt *CryptHandler
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state uint8
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init time.Time
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syn_cookie uint32
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@ -156,11 +157,31 @@ func (agent *SRTManager) process_conclusion(packet *Packet) (*Packet) {
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agent.stream_key = stream_key
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if !ok {
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resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_type = 1003
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agent.state = 3
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return resp_packet
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} else {
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agent.output = writer
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CleanFiles(agent.stream_key, 0)
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}
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case 3:
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resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).ext_field = 3
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// passphrase harcoded for testing, should pass in somehow with a user management system
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crypt_handler := NewCryptHandler("srttestpass", v.ext_contents.(*KMMSG))
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if crypt_handler == nil { // if sek unwrap required but fails
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agent.state = 3
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resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_type = 1010
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resp_ext := new(HandshakeExtension)
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resp_ext.ext_type = 4
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resp_ext.ext_len = 4
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km_state := make([]byte, 4)
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km_state[3] = 4 // BADSECRET code
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resp_ext.ext_contents = km_state
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resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions = append(resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions, resp_ext)
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return resp_packet
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}
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// else return since needed
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resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions = append(resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions, v)
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v.ext_type = 4
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}
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}
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agent.pings[0][1] = time.Now()
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