basic encryption key material handling

srt/crypt.go

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+package srt
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"hash"
+	"math"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+)
+
+type CryptHandler struct {
+	salt [16]byte
+	key_len uint8
+	odd_sek cipher.Block
+	even_sek cipher.Block
+}
+
+// init will apply to KM message immediately
+func NewCryptHandler(passphrase string, km_msg *KMMSG) (*CryptHandler) {
+	crypt := new(CryptHandler)
+	crypt.key_len = km_msg.key_len
+	crypt.salt = km_msg.salt
+	ok := crypt.Unwrap(km_msg.wrapped_key, passphrase, km_msg.key_type)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return crypt
+}
+
+// PRF as defined in RFC 8018
+func PRF(h hash.Hash, input []byte) ([]byte) {
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(input)
+	return h.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// gets KEK from passphrase and salt according to fixed SRT iterations and algo from RFC doc
+// see RFC 8018 for implementation details
+func SRT_PBKDF2(passphrase string, salt []byte, dklen uint8) ([]byte) {
+	prf := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(passphrase))
+	hlen := prf.Size()
+	l := int(math.Ceil(float64(dklen) / float64(hlen)))
+	r := int(dklen) - (l - 1) * hlen
+
+	key := make([]byte, 0)
+	for block := 1; block <= l; block++ {
+		U := make([]byte, hlen)
+		T := make([]byte, hlen)
+
+		block_i := make([]byte, 4)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(block_i, uint32(block))
+		U = PRF(prf, append(salt, block_i...))
+		copy(T, U)
+		// skip one iter since done above
+		for n := 1; n < 2048; n++ {
+			U = PRF(prf, U)
+			for x := range T {
+				T[x] ^= U[x]
+			}
+		}
+		// final block may not use entire SHA output, still need full during computation
+		if block == l {
+			T = T[:r]
+		}
+		// final key is appended sequence of all blocks computed independently
+		key = append(key, T...)
+	}
+	return key
+}
+
+// See RFC 3394, inplace implementation
+func AES_UNWRAP(key []byte, wrapped []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	seks := make([]byte, 0) // bytes past IV
+	cipher, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return seks, err
+	}
+	A := wrapped[:8] // IV bytes
+	n := len(wrapped) / 8 - 1
+	R := make([][]byte, n) // actual message (SEKs)
+	for i := range R {
+		R[i] = wrapped[(i + 1) * 8: (i + 2) * 8]
+	}
+
+	for j := 5; j >= 0; j-- {
+		for i := n; i > 0; i-- {
+			t := make([]byte, 8)
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(t, uint64(n * j + i))
+			for k := range t {
+				t[k] ^= A[k]
+			}
+			B := make([]byte, 16)
+			cipher.Decrypt(B, append(t, R[i - 1]...))
+			copy(A, B[:8])
+			copy(R[i - 1], B[8:])
+		}
+	}
+
+	// SRT uses default IV, 8 repeating bytes of 0xa6 prepended in wrap, check if
+	// preserved in unwrap
+	for i := range A {
+		if A[i] != 0xa6 {
+			return seks, errors.New("IV not default")
+		}
+	}
+	// R is 8 byte blocks, keys can be 16-32 bytes, prepend all together and
+	// let wrappers figure it out
+	for _, v := range R {
+		seks = append(seks, v...)
+	}
+	return seks, nil
+}
+
+// unwrap and store SEK ciphers, key_type defined as KK 2-bit value in Key Material from SRT docs
+func (crypt *CryptHandler) Unwrap(wrapped_key []byte, passphrase string, key_type uint8) (bool) {
+	kek := SRT_PBKDF2(passphrase, crypt.salt[8:], crypt.key_len)
+	// need a copy since original will be sent back
+	wrapped_copy := make([]byte, len(wrapped_key))
+	copy(wrapped_copy, wrapped_key)
+	seks, err := AES_UNWRAP(kek, wrapped_copy)
+	// either unwrap fails or key len does not match expected (1 or 2 SEKs len identical)
+	if err != nil  || len(seks) % int(crypt.key_len) != 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	// always have one SEK, if more bytes (second key) and peer did not send 2 keys
+	// something is wrong
+	sek_1 := seks[:crypt.key_len]
+	if len(seks) > int(crypt.key_len) && key_type != 3 {
+		return false
+	}
+	switch key_type {
+	case 1:
+		crypt.even_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_1)
+	case 2:
+		crypt.odd_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_1)
+	case 3:
+		sek_2 := seks[crypt.key_len:]
+		crypt.even_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_1)
+		crypt.odd_sek, _ = aes.NewCipher(sek_2)
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}

srt/packet.go

@@ -210,7 +210,10 @@ func marshall_hs_cif(data *HandshakeCIF) ([]byte) {
 			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ext_buff[12:14], contents.recv_delay)
 			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ext_buff[14:16], contents.send_delay)
 		case 4:
-			contents := extension.ext_contents.(*KMMSG)
+			contents, ok := extension.ext_contents.(*KMMSG)
+			if !ok { // handle km_state error
+				copy(ext_buff[4:8], extension.ext_contents.([]byte))
+			} else {
 				binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[4:8], uint32(0x12202900) | uint32(contents.key_type))
 				binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[12:16], uint32(0x02000200))
 				binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ext_buff[16:20], uint32(0x0400) | uint32(contents.key_len / 4))
@@ -218,6 +221,7 @@ func marshall_hs_cif(data *HandshakeCIF) ([]byte) {
 					ext_buff[20 + i] = contents.salt[i]
 				}
 				copy(ext_buff[36:], contents.wrapped_key)
+			}
 		default:
 			copy(ext_buff[4:], extension.ext_contents.([]byte))
 		}
@@ -317,12 +321,13 @@ func parse_hs_cif(cif *HandshakeCIF, buffer []byte) (error) {
 			content := new(KMMSG)
 			content.key_type = extensions[7] & 0x3
 			content.key_len = extensions[19] * 4
-			for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
+			for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
 				content.salt[i] = extensions[20 + i]
 			}
-			wrap_key_len := 4 + ext.ext_len - 24
+			// -36 from actual content len, extensions includes headers as well
+			wrap_key_len := 4 + ext.ext_len - 36
 			content.wrapped_key = make([]byte, wrap_key_len)
-			copy(content.wrapped_key, extensions[24:24 + wrap_key_len])
+			copy(content.wrapped_key, extensions[36:36 + wrap_key_len])
 			ext.ext_contents = content
 		default:
 			content := make([]byte, ext.ext_len)

srt/protocol.go

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ const (
 )
 
 type SRTManager struct {
+	crypt *CryptHandler
 	state uint8
 	init time.Time
 	syn_cookie uint32
@@ -156,11 +157,31 @@ func (agent *SRTManager) process_conclusion(packet *Packet) (*Packet) {
 					agent.stream_key = stream_key
 					if !ok {
 						resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_type = 1003
+						agent.state = 3
 						return resp_packet
 					} else {
 						agent.output = writer
 						CleanFiles(agent.stream_key, 0)
 					}
+				case 3:
+					resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).ext_field = 3
+					// passphrase harcoded for testing, should pass in somehow with a user management system
+					crypt_handler := NewCryptHandler("srttestpass", v.ext_contents.(*KMMSG))
+					if crypt_handler == nil { // if sek unwrap required but fails
+						agent.state = 3
+						resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_type = 1010
+						resp_ext := new(HandshakeExtension)
+						resp_ext.ext_type = 4
+						resp_ext.ext_len = 4
+						km_state := make([]byte, 4)
+						km_state[3] = 4 // BADSECRET code
+						resp_ext.ext_contents = km_state
+						resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions = append(resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions, resp_ext)
+						return resp_packet
+					}
+					// else return since needed
+					resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions = append(resp_packet.cif.(*HandshakeCIF).hs_extensions, v)
+					v.ext_type = 4
 				}
 			}
 			agent.pings[0][1] = time.Now()